A Tea Party at The Hague? by Burbank, Stephen B.
University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School 
Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository 
Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law 
2012 
A Tea Party at The Hague? 
Stephen B. Burbank 
University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship 
 Part of the American Politics Commons, Civil Procedure Commons, Dispute Resolution and Arbitration 
Commons, International Law Commons, International Relations Commons, Litigation Commons, Public 
Administration Commons, Public Law and Legal Theory Commons, and the Public Policy Commons 
Repository Citation 
Burbank, Stephen B., "A Tea Party at The Hague?" (2012). Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law. 406. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/406 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law by an authorized administrator of Penn Law: Legal 
Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact PennlawIR@law.upenn.edu. 
HAGUE SSRN.doc 4/17/2012 9:34 AM 
FORTHCOMING IN 18 SW. J. INT’L L. 
101 
              A TEA PARTY AT THE HAGUE? 
                                             Stephen B. Burbank* 
   
 
                                         Abstract 
 
In this article, I consider the prospects for and impediments to judicial 
cooperation with the United States.  I do so by describing a personal 
journey that began more than twenty years ago when I first taught and 
wrote about international civil litigation.  An important part of my journey 
has involved studying the role that the United States has played, and can 
usefully play, in fostering judicial cooperation, including through judgment 
recognition and enforcement.  The journey continues but, today, finds me a 
weary traveler, more worried than ever about the politics and practice of 
international procedural lawmaking in the United States.  Disputes about 
the proper roles of federal and state law and institutions in the 
implementation of the Hague Choice of Court Convention suggest that this 
little corner of American foreign policy is at risk of capture by forces that, 
manifesting some of the worst characteristics of domestic politics, would 
have us host a tea party at The Hague. 
 
 
  Scholars of transnational litigation are familiar with the question 
whether a foreign judgment can or should be given greater preclusive effect 
in this country than it would be given at home, as for instance when the 
applicable U.S. law, but not that of the rendering court, would permit non-
mutual issue preclusion.  When first considering that question, I was struck 
not so much by the very different views that had been expressed, notably by 
Hans Smit1 and Courtland Peterson,2 but by how closely those views 
followed from their exponents’ understanding of the policy goals 
 
© Stephen B. Burbank 2012 
* David Berger Professor for the Administration of Justice, University of Pennsylvania. An 
earlier version of this article was presented as the keynote address at a workshop on judicial 
cooperation for Italian judges, which was sponsored by the European University Institute in 
Florence on October 28-29, 2011. 
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underlying the law of preclusion when it operates internationally.3  Mindful 
that the same question had arisen in wholly domestic interjurisdictional 
proceedings, I was also struck by the power of clear thinking about the 
purposes of the full faith and credit clause to influence the answer.4 
 
Transnational judgment recognition and enforcement law and practice 
are, inescapably, aspects of a country’s foreign policy.  That is easy enough 
to see when they are the subject of international agreements. The United 
States is not party to any such agreement.  Courts do not for that reason, 
however, stop being, and being seen by people in other countries as, 
expositors and formulators of national policy.  This fact can be obscured by 
describing transnational judgment recognition and enforcement as a form of 
judicial cooperation, particularly if, as in the EU, it is lumped with other 
topics, only some of which have comparable salience for international 
relations.5  Moreover, such salience is easier to miss in the United States 
than elsewhere because of the absence of federal statutory rules and the 
prominent default role that state law has been allowed to assume. 
 
In this article, I consider the prospects for and impediments to judicial 
cooperation with the United States, a country whose courts have been called 
the light to which prospective foreign plaintiffs are drawn like moths,6 and 
are a light that most prospective foreign defendants would like to turn out.  I 
will do so by describing a personal journey that began more than twenty 
years ago when I first taught and wrote about international civil litigation.  
An important part of my journey has involved studying the role that the 
 
1.  See Hans Smit, International Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel in the United States, 9 
UCLA L. REV. 44, 56 (1962) (rejecting interstate perspective).  
2.  See Courtland H. Peterson, Res Judicata and Foreign Country Judgments, 24 OHIO ST. 
L.J. 291, 302-08 (1963) (embracing interstate perspective). 
3.  See Stephen B. Burbank, Federal Judgments Law: Sources of Authority and Sources of 
Rules, 70 TEX. L. REV. 1551, 1582-86 (1992); id. at 1584 (“[T]hose who would ignore foreign law 
and policy in the recognition area are in reality calling for a return to isolationism.”). 
4.  “In international cases as in interstate cases, the answer to the question whether a 
recognizing court can or should give the rendering court’s judgments greater preclusive effects 
than they would have at home depends upon policy focus.” Id. at 1585. 
5.  The EU’s civil justice website identifies the key components of the EU’s approach to 
judicial cooperation as: service of documents, taking of evidence, recognition and enforcement of 
judgments, the free circulation of public documents, and the development of the European Judicial 
Network, which seeks to foster cooperation through the use of technology for the benefit of both 
the public and members of the Network. See European Comm’n, Judicial Cooperation, 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/civil/judicial-cooperation/index_en.htm (last updated Feb. 3, 2012). 
6.  “As a moth is drawn to the light, so is a litigant drawn to the United States.  If he can 
only get his case into their courts, he stands to win a fortune.”  Smith Kline & French Labs. v. 
Block, [1983] 2 All E.R. 72, 74 (Denning, J.). 
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United States has played, and can usefully play, in fostering judicial 
cooperation, including through judgment recognition and enforcement.  The 
journey continues but, today, finds me a weary traveler, more worried than 
ever about the politics and practice of international procedural lawmaking 
in the United States.  This little corner of American foreign policy is at risk 
of capture by forces that, manifesting some of the worst characteristics of 
domestic politics, would have us host a tea party at The Hague. 
 
In the early 1990s I was invited to participate in a symposium 
celebrating the one-hundredth anniversary of The Hague Conference on 
Private International Law.  In rereading the article I wrote for that occasion7 
as preparation for this one, it occurred to me that I should assume the 
sobriquet given to Alden Whitman, formerly the obituary writer for The 
New York Times.  Mr. Whitman liked to be prepared and thus would seek a 
pre-mortem interview with famous people he deemed ripe to shuffle off 
their mortal coil.  As a result, among those receiving a request for an 
interview, Whitman became known as “Mr. Bad News.”8 
 
The news I bear today is bad news for those who believe in the 
importance of judicial cooperation to robust global, and not just national or 
regional, markets.  Since mine is a bleak message, it is probably useful to 
make clear what might otherwise be left to inference, at least among those 
who have not read my 1994 article.  Largely as a result of legislation 
enacted and court rules promulgated in the 1960s, the United States is 
prepared to provide very generous assistance, on a non-reciprocal basis, to 
foreign tribunals and to litigants in proceedings before them, both by 
serving process or other documents and by taking evidence in aid of those 
proceedings.9  Moreover, the standards governing the recognition and 
enforcement of internationally foreign judgments under American law have 
been generous for more than a century.10 
 
 
7.  Stephen B. Burbank, The Reluctant Partner: Making Procedural Law for International 
Civil Litigation, 57 LAW. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 103 (1994). 
8.  See GAY TALESE, THE GAY TALESE READER: PORTRAITS AND ENCOUNTERS 172 
(2003).  
9.  See Burbank, supra note 7, at 107-11 (describing work and work product of Commission 
and Advisory Committee on International Rules of Judicial Procedure). 
10.  See Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895); Burbank, supra note 4, at 1574 (observing 
that, with exception of reciprocity, the Court in Hilton “essentially said that foreign judgments 
should be treated as if they issued from courts of neighboring states – as if they were entitled to 
full faith and credit”); id. at 1575 (noting that “whether in cases or statutes, the states have largely 
adopted the basic rules announced in Hilton”). 
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If American law and legal institutions stand ready to provide such 
generous assistance, why the gloomy report? The key here is the fact that 
these steps have been taken unilaterally,11 and unilateral generosity is not 
the equivalent of cooperation.  In addition, not infrequently such unilateral 
generosity has been accompanied by unilateral claims of power—as for 
instance to serve process in violation of the law of other countries.12  More 
deeply, the habit of taking action unilaterally makes it harder both to reach 
agreements that can be the foundation of cooperation and, once such 
agreements have been concluded, to interpret them in a cooperative spirit.13 
 
More recent developments suggest that the prospects for transnational 
judicial cooperation with the United States are worse, not better.  For, 
having poked its head out of international law and private international law 
cocoons on the field of civil litigation, the United States appears to be 
regressing to a posture of isolationism and xenophobia that is reminiscent of 
the second half of the nineteenth century.  This should not be surprising to 
the extent that international and transnational legal arrangements in the 
United States reflect or move in tandem with domestic politics.  The 
industrialists of the second half of the nineteenth century would recognize 
and applaud the enthusiasm for laissez faire capitalism that dominates one 
part of the American political landscape today, while those struggling to 
find work building the transcontinental rail lines would appreciate 
contemporary American xenophobia.14  Moreover, although George W. 
Bush is no Theodore Roosevelt, the impulse to extend American economic 
influence through unilateral military action, while trumpeting the benefits 
of democracy, also unites the two periods.  
 
 
11.  See Burbank, supra note 7, at 110-11 (discussing legislation recommended by 
Commission and Advisory Committee on International Rules of Civil Procedure and enacted by 
Congress). 
12.  See id. at 112-14 (discussing 1963 amendments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure); id. 
at 113 (“Rule 4(i) represented a unilateral assertion of power in aid of litigation in the federal 
courts, affording great flexibility but not requiring deference to foreign law or consideration of the 
international implications of service.”). 
13.  See id. at 126-27 (discussing Supreme Court decisions interpreting Hague Service and 
Evidence Conventions); id. at 113 (noting Court’s “determination to preserve as much domestic 
procedural law as possible” and “reluctance to interpret treaties so as to confer greater rights on 
foreign litigants than their domestic opponents”). 
14.  See RICHARD WHITE, RAILROADED: THE TRANSCONTINENTALS AND THE MAKING OF 
MODERN AMERICA (2011) (describing transcontinental railroads as “Gilded Age extravagance” 
and chronicling hostility of Knights of Labor to Chinese contract laborers).  
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 My 1994 article was entitled “The Reluctant Partner: Making 
Procedural Law for International Civil Litigation.”15  In it, I reminded 
readers that, not having joined The Hague Conference for the first seventy 
years of that organization’s existence, the United States had “missed many 
earlier birthday parties.”16  I also suggested that other members of the 
Conference—”particularly countries that are also parties to The Hague 
Service Convention and The Hague Evidence Convention—m[ight] doubt 
[the United States’] willingness to abide by [its] international obligations.”17  
I then sought to advance understanding of the United States’ ambivalence 
about international commitments in the domain of procedure and private 
international law by setting it in historical and institutional context. 
  
Thus, I suggested that the shortness of the history of U.S. engagement 
with procedural problems in international civil litigation was related to the 
length of the list of relevant institutional actors, noting that “[f]or years, the 
supposed requirements of U.S. federalism hindered international lawmaking 
through private international law treaties as effectively as they did a federal 
law of procedure for the federal courts.”18  Although the federal courts were 
finally empowered to apply federal procedural law in the 1930s, I observed 
that “federalism objections die hard in the international arena.”19  
 
The core of my 1994 article was an attempt to identify common threads 
that ran throughout the United States’ lawmaking efforts in the domain of 
international civil litigation and that had “in the past prevented or hindered 
the process of dialogue and mutual education necessary for international 
cooperation.”20  Most important among those threads, I argued, were, first, 
unilateralism; second, a preference for national over international 
uniformity; and, third, penuriousness, that is, unwillingness to spend 
money.  I argued “that unilateralism deserves to be buried, not reborn, that 
international uniformity is increasingly more important than national 
uniformity, and that both international education and education about 
international and comparative law require more patience and more public 
resources than [the United States had] previously been willing to 
commit.”21 
 
15.  Burbank, supra note 7. 
16.  Id. at 103. 
17.  Id. 
18.  Id. at 104. 
19.  Id. 
20.  Id. at 105. 
21.  Id. 
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Although the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision interpreting The Hague 
Service Convention in the Schlunk case,22and its decision interpreting and 
Hague Evidence Convention in the Aerospatiale case,23 well illustrated the 
baneful influences of unilateralism, preference for domestic uniformity and 
impatience,24  I thought that we might learn some useful lessons. 
 
One of the lessons to be learned was that, although treaty making in the 
field of transnational judicial cooperation need not require a marathon, it is 
unlikely to yield something worthwhile if it is a sprint.  In the case of The 
Hague Evidence Convention, which was first proposed in 1967 and 
concluded in 1968,25 I now believe that we would be better off starting over 
from scratch.  That is because work on a new evidence convention would 
proceed in a very different environment—one in which there may be more 
enthusiasm for what, as a concession to the shortness of life, I will call 
discovery in countries that are turning toward private enforcement of 
statutory and administrative law, and distinctly less enthusiasm for 
discovery in the United States, which is turning away from private 
enforcement.26  Starting over from scratch would also make sense given the 
much greater level of shared knowledge and understanding about taking 
evidence that exists today than when representatives of some member states 
believed that “pretrial discovery” occurs before a case has been filed.27  We 
should be able to benefit from this process of mutual education, to which 
the efforts made in developing the American Law Institute/Unidroit 
 
22.  See Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694 (1988) (holding that it 
is a matter of internal law whether service needs to be made abroad, thus triggering that 
Convention). 
23.  See Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. United States Dist. Court for the S. 
District of Iowa, 482 U.S. 522 (1987) (holding that use of that Convention is optional). 
24.  See Burbank, supra note 7, at 126-27, 131-33. 
25.  See id. at 133-34 (arguing that misunderstanding and disagreements about interpretation 
of Evidence Convention were “attributable to inadequate education as much as to bad 
draftsmanship”). 
26.  See Stephen B. Burbank, Sean Farhang, and Herbert M. Kritzer, Private Enforcement of 
Statutory and Administrative Law in the United States (and Other Common Law Countries), in  
_________________________ (Burkhard Hess, ed. 2012); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 
550 U.S. 544, 559, 560 n.6 (2007) (citing Frank Easterbrook, Discovery as Abuse, 69 B.U. L. 
REV. 635, 638-39 (1989)). 
27.  See Burbank, supra note 7, at 134; J.H.A. van Loon, The Hague Conventions on Private 
International Law, in THE EFFECT OF TREATIES ON DOMESTIC LAW 221, 225 (Francis G. Jacobs 
& Shelley Roberts, eds. 1987); Hague Conference on Private International Law: Special 
Commission Report on the Operation of the Hague Service Convention and the Hague Evidence 
Convention, 28 I.L.M. 1556, 1563-64 (1989). 
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Principles of Transnational Civil Procedure28 have made a substantial 
contribution. 
 
It is harder to know what lessons to take from the Schlunk decision 
other than that a treaty of the United States deserves to be accorded the 
generative (judicial) lawmaking power of an ordinary federal statute.29  It is 
also harder to know whether in this area as well we would be better off 
starting over from scratch.  A reason for uncertainty as to both is that the 
Supreme Court has never again interpreted The Hague Service Convention.  
Of course, in the intervening decades the Court’s appetite for work has 
become notably anorexic.  To the extent that this startling decline in 
decided cases reflects the desire of some justices to advance understanding 
of U.S. legal arrangements by writing books, giving speeches, and attending 
international conferences, perhaps we should applaud.  Before doing so, 
however, we should recognize that cases raising other international civil 
litigation issues have prospered even under the Court’s new low-volume 
diet and that on issues such as whether Article 10(a) of the Service 
Convention authorizes service by mail,30 the long-standing conflict among 
federal courts of appeals and state courts is not going to go away,31 and it 
continues to impose unnecessary expense and risk on prospective plaintiffs. 
 
Reasons for optimism that the United States might become a less 
reluctant partner had to do with what I took to be implications of the United 
States’ declining power in an increasingly global marketplace, coupled with 
robust evidence of the costs of unilateralism in making law for international 
civil litigation.  These two strands converged in an effort by the United 
States, which in 1994 was just underway, to develop a global jurisdiction 
and judgments convention under the auspices of The Hague Conference.  
An important stimulus to the effort was concern that unilaterally generous 
domestic law governing the recognition and enforcement of internationally 
 
28.  See PRINCIPLES OF TRANSNATIONAL CIVIL PROCEDURE 36-38 (2006) (Access to 
Information and Evidence). 
29.  See Stephen B. Burbank, The World in Our Courts 89 MICH. L. REV. 1456, 1493 (1991); 
Burbank, supra note 7, at 126-27. 
30.   “Provided the State of destination does not object, the present Convention shall not 
interfere with – (a) the freedom to send judicial documents, by postal channels, directly to persons 
abroad . . . .”  Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil 
or Commercial Matters, approved Oct. 28, 1964, art. 2; 20 U.S.T. 361, 658 U.N.T.S. 163, art. 
10(a). 
31.  See, e.g., Rojas v. Hitachi Koki Co., Ltd., 2009 WL 3924762 (Mass. Super. Sept. 29, 
2009); Honda Motor Co. v. Superior Court, 12 Cal. Rptr.2d 861 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992); Ackermann 
v. Levine, 788 F.2d 830 (2d Cir. 1986). 
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foreign judgments not only had not elicited emulation by other countries.32  
Rather, it stood in stark contrast to provisions of the Brussels Convention 
(and the successor European Council Regulation) that discriminated against 
American defendants by permitting the use of exorbitant jurisdictional 
standards and requiring other member states to recognize such judgments.33  
Moreover, because the United States had already given away the store by 
being unilaterally generous as to judgments, it had lost a good deal of 
bargaining power and might therefore have to yield in the area where those 
negotiating for other countries would seek advantage, in particular 
standards for the assertion of adjudicatory jurisdiction. 
 
Indeed, as the negotiations at The Hague proceeded, the prospect of a 
global jurisdiction and judgments convention caused me to reflect on the 
various respects in which international procedural lawmaking might enable 
improvements in both European and United States law.34  Those reflections 
resulted in a 2001 article on jurisdictional equilibration devices, in 
particular forum non conveniens, lis pendens and anti-suit injunctions.35  
The function of these devices is, as the name I gave them suggests, to 
achieve balance—think of the French word for a tightrope walker: un 
équilibriste.36  They are devices “easing the agony of foresight by which 
jurisdiction is protected or declined and its potential to yield an enforceable 
judgment fructified or frustrated.”37 
 
 
32.  Canada is an exception. See Vaughan Black, A Canada-United States Full Faith and 
Credit Clause?, 18 SW. J. INT’L L.__ (2012) (discussing Morguard Investments Ltd. v. De 
Savoye, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 1077). 
33.  See Samuel P. Baumgartner, The Proposed Changes to the European Union’s Regime of 
Recognizing and Enforcing Foreign Judgments, 18 SW. J. INT’L L.    ,     (2012) [Draft at 5-6]; id. 
at [Draft at 6] (“Not only can the courts of the EU-member states take jurisdiction over such 
defendants on the basis of exorbitant jurisdictional rules that are outlawed in the inter-community 
context, but the emanating judgment must be recognized and enforced in all of the other member 
states without further examination of the originating court’s jurisdiction.”); Arthur T. von Mehren, 
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments: A New Approach for the Hague 
Conference?, 57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 271 (1994) (describing and analyzing U.S. proposal); 
Burbank, supra note 3, at 1572-73.  
34.  See Stephen B. Burbank, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: End of the Century or Beginning of 
the Millennium?, 7 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 111, 116 (1999) (“[T]he current project at the Hague 
can be seen as an opportunity to use international lawmaking to bring about change [in domestic 
law]…”). 
35. See Stephen B. Burbank, Jurisdictional Equilibration, the Proposed Hague Convention 
and Progress in National Law, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 203 (2001). 
36.  See id. at 205-06 n.12. 
37.  Id. at 206. 
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Study of this part of the procedural landscape led me to argue that the 
draft Hague Convention’s lis pendens provisions were superior to the 
Brussels regime.  I so concluded both because they recognized the potential 
mischief of giving strict precedence to actions for negative declarations—
captured in the marvelous image of an Italian torpedo38—and, more 
generally, because they would include both a forum non conveniens check, 
albeit one that did not use that dreaded Latin phrase, and a check enabling 
the second filed action to proceed if a judgment issuing from the first filed 
forum would not be capable of recognition.39  
 
I also concluded that domestic United States law could be improved 
through study of both the Brussels regime and the draft Hague provisions.  
First, the latter made clear the extent to which forum non conveniens 
doctrine that distinguishes between plaintiffs solely by reason of nationality 
is offensive to other countries.40  Second, both the importance of lis pendens 
in the Brussels regime and the potential modifications of a strict lis pendens 
system proposed in the Hague draft set in relief the long-standing 
incoherence of American federal law, which in some circuits treats the 
courts of Italy as if they were other federal courts and in others as if they 
were courts of the one of the states of the United States.  Of course, they 
should be assimilated to neither.41  Third, the reasons for refusal to permit 
anti-suit injunctions under the Brussels regime and awareness of the useful 
function they could perform, albeit in carefully defined circumstances, 
could help to rationalize and make uniform another area of federal 
procedure where competing models had created—and continue to foster—
incoherence.42   
 
In both the 1994 and 2001 articles I underestimated the power of the 
private sector to drive United States policy in the field of international 
procedural law making.  One might have thought that the geopolitical 
ramifications of international commerce would induce attention to the 
possibility that wise national policy in this domain is not always dictated by 
private preferences.  If “the chief business of the American people [was] 
 
38.  Stephen B. Burbank, International Litigation in U.S. Courts: Becoming a Paper Tiger?, 
33 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 663, 663 (2012) (“That colorful metaphor conceives a would-be plaintiff’s 
case as a ship and suggests the effect on it of conferring the benefits of the EU’s strict lis pendens 
rule on actions for a negative declaration (declaratory judgment) when filed first in Italy’s 
sclerotic judicial system, which is badly in need of angioplasty.”).  
39.  See Burbank, supra note 35, at 219-23. 
40.  See id. at 242. 
41.  See id. at 227-34. 
42.  See id. at 235. 
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business”43 in 1925, how much more important is international business 
today?  And perhaps what I have called “the geopolitical ramifications of 
international commerce” might have done so had the State Department not 
chosen to use the supposed preeminence of private preferences as a 
normative shield for its decision—from the time when an office was created 
for private international law—to starve that office of resources.44  
 
This is a major manifestation of the penuriousness to which I earlier 
referred.  It forces the State Department to rely on the kindness, if not of 
strangers, then of rent-seekers advancing interests whose congruity with the 
national interest may be a matter of chance.  The argument that private 
preferences must be honored (or at least mollified through compromise) in 
order to secure domestic ratification of a treaty is a capitulation to a 
particular view of government that, when translated to the international 
stage, hardly bodes well for mutual respect and cooperation.45  It is also an 
invitation to extortion. 
 
Thus, the effort to craft a global jurisdiction and judgments convention 
at The Hague failed in part because elements of the American private bar 
vigorously opposed, and persuaded the American delegation to oppose, the 
effort of negotiators from other countries to cut back on grounds of 
adjudicatory jurisdiction that they deemed exorbitant, including in 
particular general doing business jurisdiction.46  Yet, some of us whose only 
interest was progress in judicial cooperation had welcomed this opportunity 
to civilize domestic American law through an international lawmaking 
 
43.  Cyndy Bittinger, The Business of America is Business?, CALVIN-COOLIDGE.ORG, 
http://www.calvin-coolidge.org/html/the_business_of_america_is_bus.html (last visited March 6, 
2012). 
44.  See Burbank, supra note 7, at 141-43. 
45.   
The United States has interests in private international law that transcend, and may even 
conflict with, the collective preferences of U.S. legal consumers. Federal and state governments 
devote substantial resources to the establishment and maintenance of court systems. In addition, 
the resolution of international disputes and the establishment of behavioral norms for international 
actors are increasingly critical to our economic and social well-being as a nation. There is no 
bright line between public and private law, a fact that both complicates the work of reaching 
international agreements on matters of private international law and highlights the importance of 
adequate public support for the enterprise. 
Id. at 143 (footnotes omitted). 
46.  See Linda J. Silberman, Comparative Jurisdiction in the International Context: Will the 
Proposed Hague Judgments Convention Be Stalled?, 52 DEPAUL L REV. 319 (2002); Linda J. 
Silberman, The Impact of Jurisdictional Rules and Recognition Practice on International Business 
Transactions: The U.S. Regime, 26 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 327 (2004). 
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initiative.47  For people so inclined, the Supreme Court’s recent decision in 
the Goodyear Dunlop Tires case,48 strictly limiting the scope of application 
of general doing business jurisdiction, although satisfying, comes a decade 
too late.  Unfortunately, Justice Ginsburg’s largely well–reasoned opinion 
demonstrates the riskiness of forays into comparative law by confusing the 
question whether the plaintiff’s domicile is an acceptable basis for 
adjudicatory jurisdiction with the question whether the fact of a plaintiff’s 
domicile in the forum grounds interests that might legitimately be 
considered in the all-things-considered analysis that I believe the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires.49 
 
As suggested by my comments on the Supreme Court’s neglect of The 
Hague Service Convention after the Schlunk decision in 1988, I also 
underestimated what I have called that court’s “anorexic appetite for work.”  
I am happy that the Court has paid more attention to the problems of 
international civil litigation in the past decade than it had in many previous 
decades. But there is so much more work to be done and no credible excuse 
for not doing it.  The Court has never addressed (at least in modern 
memory) the standards that govern the questions whether a federal court 
should (or even can) dismiss (or stay) a pending action in deference to an 
action pending in another country.  
 
 The conflict among, and incoherence resulting from, lower court cases 
that answer those questions by resort to competing domestic models, neither 
of which is appropriate and one of which is itself incoherent in its original 
setting, continues.50  Those courts that have fashioned special lis pendens 
rules for transnational cases have not satisfactorily reconciled the resulting 
doctrine with domestic law that is relevant, namely that which concerns the 
power of federal courts to decline to exercise jurisdiction granted by 
Congress.51  Time and money are being wasted.  The same inapt domestic 
models taint, and the same confusion and waste attend, litigation in the 
 
47.  See Stephen B. Burbank, Jurisdictional Conflict and Jurisdictional Equilibration: Paths 
to a Via Media?, 26 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 385, 386-92 (2004). 
48.  Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846 (2011). 
49.  See Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2857 n.5; Burbank, supra note 38, at 670-71. For the due 
process analysis that is appropriate for general doing business jurisdiction, see Burbank, supra 
note 34, at 749-53. 
50.  See Burbank, supra note 35, at 213-15. 
51.  See Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706 (1996) (federal court lacks power to 
implement abstention in favor of state court litigation by dismissal in action seeking common law 
damage remedy); Posner v. Essex Ins. Co., 178 F.3d 1209, 1223 (11th Cir. 1999) (Quackenbush 
not binding in international context). 
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lower federal courts with respect to the law that governs the issuance of 
anti-suit injunctions against litigation abroad.52 
 
A decade of effort at The Hague did not go completely to waste.  To 
their credit, the negotiators recognized that progress might be made 
incrementally.  In particular, again encouraged by the United States, they 
recognized that a convention governing jurisdiction based on exclusive 
choice of court agreements between businesses and the recognition and 
enforcement of judgments entered by courts exercising such jurisdiction 
might be useful in its own right by making litigation a more attractive 
alternative to arbitration.  If successful, a limited convention might also be 
useful as a springboard to renewed efforts toward a comprehensive 
convention.53  
 
The Hague Choice of Court Convention was concluded in 2005.54 It 
has not come into force. The primary reason, I believe, is that most other 
countries are waiting to see whether and how the United States ratifies and 
implements the convention. They may be waiting a very long time.  For, at 
about the time the global jurisdiction and judgments project collapsed, there 
were two related developments that caused the landscape of United States’ 
participation in international private lawmaking to appear antediluvian, 
developments having to do with political ideology and institutional turf.  
They demonstrate that federalism objections die even harder in the 
international arena than I recognized in 1994. 
 
According to its website, the “Uniform Law Commission [ULC] 
provides states with non-partisan, well conceived, and well drafted 
legislation that brings clarity and stability to critical areas of state statutory 
law.”55  Before the administration of George W. Bush showed the world 
that the most expeditious way to overcome obstacles presented by 
international law was systematically to ignore or dismantle their source, the 
Uniform Law Commissioners had reason to worry about remaining relevant 
in a world where the laws of the several states of the United States seemed 
increasingly marginal—a world where the United Nations Convention on 
 
52.  See Burbank, supra note 35, at 214. 
53.  See Stephen B. Burbank, Federalism and Private International Law, 2 J. PRIV. INT’L L. 
287, 288-89 (2006) (discussing the goals of those who advocated the Choice of Court 
Convention). 
54.  Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, concluded 30 June 2005, 
http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php.act=conventions.pdf&cid=98. 
55.  UNIFORM LAW COMMISSION, http://www.nccusl.org/ (last visited March 10, 2012). 
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Contracts for the Sale of Goods and similar treaties might one day be more 
important than the Uniform Commercial Code in the courts of Kansas.  
 
Having failed to derail a project of the American Law Institute that 
proposed a draft federal statute to govern the recognition and enforcement 
of internationally foreign judgments,56 the ULC may have seen in the 
change of administrations in 2001 and the resuscitation of negotiations at 
The Hague an opportunity to deploy conservative American ideology, or 
that part of it that worships states’ rights when it is convenient to do so, in 
the service of the ULC’s own institutional interests.  Certainly, it is 
convenient for the ULC’s claim of non-partisanship that its agents can 
obscure in the bosom of service to the states very different, often highly 
contestable and partisan, views about the appropriate domains of state and 
federal law.  Capitalizing on the opportunity, however, required (1) the 
development of theoretical foundations for ULC participation in 
international lawmaking and (2) the development of practical political 
alliances that would help the ULC to build on those foundations.  
 
My colleague, Curtis Reitz, himself a Uniform Commissioner and (at 
the time) chair of the ULC’s (aptly named) International Legal 
Development Committee laid some theoretical foundations in a 2005 
article.57  Forging practical political alliances was not difficult.  The ULC 
secured a position on the United States delegation negotiating the Choice of 
Court Convention at The Hague at the tail end of that process, and, when 
the Bush administration left office, they retained the former head of the 
private international law office in the State Department as a consultant.58  
The claim to protect the legitimate lawmaking prerogatives of the states 
makes it easy for the ULC to enlist the support of the Conference of State 
Chief Justices.  Whether the ULC’s efforts in fact do so, as opposed to 
securing turf for the ULC, may be hard for those not expert in an area, 
 
56.  AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN 
JUDGMENTS: ANALYSIS AND PROPOSED FEDERAL STATUTE: (2005).  As an Adviser to this project, 
see id. at vii, I witnessed attempts by those associated with the ULC to derail the project or restrict 
its scope. Indeed, it seems likely that the ULC undertook revisions to a 1962 uniform act on 
foreign-country judgment recognition  either for those purposes or to prevent the enactment of any 
proposed legislation that the ALI project might produce.  See UNIFORM FOREIGN-COUNTRY 
MONEY JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT (2005), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ 
archives/ulc/ufmjra/2005final.htm. 
57. See Curtis R. Reitz, Globalization, International Legal Development, and Uniform State 
Laws, 51 LOYOLA L. REV. 301 (2005). 
58. David P. Stewart is listed as a consultant to the ULC drafting committee for the Choice of 
Court Convention Implementation Act.  See http://www.nccusl.org/Committee.aspx?title=Choice 
%20of%20Court%20Agreements%20Convention%20Implementation%20Act. 
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particularly an area with international dimensions, to determine.  Finally, 
since the implementation of The Hague Choice of Court Convention 
requires decisions about the allocation of judicial business between the 
federal and state courts, on those issues at least, the ULC may look for the 
support of the institutional federal judiciary, particularly in a time of 
budgetary distress. 
 
Indeed, it is not clear that political alliances are necessary for the ULC 
to have its way on issues where the federal-state equilibrium and 
international law can be packaged.  The Hague Service and Evidence 
Conventions were ratified as self-executing treaties, a legal form that, after 
Medellin v. Texas,59 is on the cutting edge of obsolescence in the United 
States.  In Medellin the Court concluded that the International Court of 
Justice’s judgment holding that the United States had violated the Vienna 
Convention on Consular Relations by failing to inform 51 Mexican 
nationals, including Medellin, of their Vienna Convention rights, is not 
binding domestic law because none of the relevant treaty sources creates 
binding federal law in the absence of implementing legislation, and no such 
legislation had been enacted.  
 
Since implementing legislation is not only politically necessary but 
also objectively appropriate, and given that The Hague Choice of Court 
Convention presents the federal-state equilibrium and international law 
package, one can easily imagine, or imagine the stimulation of, a partisan 
reception in some quarters.  At least when legislators in those quarters have 
either a majority in one house of Congress or forty-one votes in the Senate, 
the ULC’s opposition to implementation solely through a federal statute 
would likely be fatal.  The fact that such a “my way or the highway” 
approach might be inimical to the national interest again suggests the 
downside of the State Department’s long-standing dependence on the 
private sector in the area of private international law. 
 
I was ignorant of much of this background when I addressed Professor 
Reitz’s proposal for the use of uniform state law to implement treaties in a 
2006 article.60  Acknowledging that there might be a role for uniform state 
law in the development and implementation of treaties concerning 
international private law, I argued that the same reasons did not obtain with 
respect to private international law treaties or at least with respect to The 
 
59.  552 U.S. 491 (2008). 
60.  See Burbank, supra note 53. 
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Hague Choice of Court Convention.61  Agreeing that federalism is 
important in the United States, I pointed out that it is “also important that 
the United States be able to participate effectively in a global economy and 
that those charged with the conduct of the country’s foreign affairs be able 
to make, and that the country abide by, international agreements that are 
designed to facilitate transnational commercial activity.”62  
 
The Hague Choice of Court Convention, I noted, “leaves little room for 
variation or departure in standards for asserting jurisdiction or recognizing 
and enforcing judgments.”63  Moreover, where it does leave room, “the 
history of domestic regulation does not provide strong normative support 
for state law to furnish the rules.”64  I concluded that “federal 
implementation through legislation prescribing federal law that is mostly 
uniform, but a few provisions of which may borrow designated state law, 
would impose lower transaction and administrability costs, with no loss of 
accessibility, than would state implementation.”65 
 
The six years since this article was published have been surreal.  As a 
participant in a study group of the Secretary of State’s Advisory Committee 
on Private International Law and a smaller ad hoc group that has tried to 
find common ground, I have been repeatedly exposed to the ULC’s theory 
of “cooperative federalism.”  I use the word “exposed” advisedly, because 
whatever its merits in a wholly domestic context, in the international 
context the theory has the destructive potential of a communicable disease.  
It has often seemed to me that some representatives of the ULC do not 
 
61.  See id. at 299-308. 
62.  Id. at 308-09. 
63.  Id. at 309. See id. at 300 (“It is no surprise that the Hague Convention looks like a self-
executing treaty. The quest for uniformity and certainty - for reciprocity – that animated the treaty 
left little room for variation or departure.”). 
64.  Id. at 309.  
Whether in response to the Hague Convention or to the ALI’s proposed federal foreign-
country recognition and enforcement statute, one hears claims that, because state law has 
dominated the American jurisdiction and judgments landscape in international cases to date, 
it should continue to do so. The relationship between federal and state law in both parts of 
this jurisprudential landscape is, however, more complex than these claims acknowledge. 
Indeed, in neither part of the landscape does a consideration of past practice yield a 
persuasive normative argument for state law to continue playing a dominant role.  
Id. at 295. 
65.  Id. at 309. “To require implementation by state law in these circumstances might well 
seem ‘a mere token gesture achieved at the expense of … economy.’ Alternatively, or in addition, 
it might be regarded as another manifestation of the United States’ willingness to undermine 
treaties by preferring domestic to international uniformity.” Id. at 300 (footnotes omitted). 
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understand the issues, and that some feign lack of understanding in order to 
protect ideology, turf, or both.   
 
What, after all, is so difficult to understand about the proposition that 
legitimate state lawmaking prerogatives can be adequately protected by 
provisions in a federal implementing statute that borrow state law?66  Or the 
proposition that “there is no necessary connection between the process used 
to implement the treaty and the source of the rules to which resort is made 
for that purpose?”67  Or the proposition that the complexity of an 
implementation regime which required consulting and figuring out the 
relationships among a federal statute, a state version of a uniform act, and 
case law interpreting the state statute would drive transactional lawyers to 
arbitration and drive litigators to drink?  That is if the treaty ever became 
effective, which it probably would not because other countries would 
conclude that someone had slipped Kool Aid into our tea, causing us to 
regress from reluctant to recalcitrant partner.  
 
The Legal Adviser to the State Department has devoted a substantial 
amount of time to the implementation of the Choice of Court Convention in 
an effort to find acceptable compromise positions. Compromise has usually 
been one-sided, and that side is not the ULC.  To date, the process has 
yielded proposed federal and uniform statutes that are in all pertinent 
respects identical. I repeat, the process has yielded proposed federal and 
uniform statutes that are in all pertinent respects identical.  Now I 
understand.  “Cooperative federalism” means cooperative redundancy.  Or 
perhaps not.  One important remaining issue concerns the circumstances in 
which the law of states that adopted the proposed uniform act would be 
preempted and the standards for determining preemption. 
 
To picture my reaction upon first hearing a ULC proposal that the 
uniform act—as adopted by the ULC, not as actually made law by any state 
–be the standard for assessing preemption, think of the Aflac duck listening 
to Yogi Berra’s observation, “and they give you cash, which is just as good 
as money.”68  Ignoring the well-known fact that uniform laws are not 
 
66.  See id. at 298-99. 
67.  Id. at 301. 
68.  See YOU TUBE, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=O-EZf56AfYc (last visited March 
10, 2012). 
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uniform69 requires one to be either obtuse or disingenuous.  Believing that 
the work product of unelected private citizens should be the standard for 
determining whether the United States is honoring its international 
commitments requires an impressive capacity for institutional 
aggrandizement. 
 
The fact that, given the goals of the Choice of Court Convention,70 it 
makes no sense to implement that treaty through a combination of a federal 
statute and a uniform act, which would not be enacted by all states and 
some of the language of which, even if faithfully enacted at the state level, 
would predictably be interpreted in different ways, is water under the bridge 
of “compromise.”  I suspect that the ULC cares less about the success of 
The Hague Choice of Court Convention than it does about setting a 
favorable precedent that would help to advance the ULC’s international 
legal program. 
 
The entire experience, at least to this point, does not suggest that the 
United States has made progress in private international lawmaking – quite 
the contrary.  If the ULC were successful, our long-standing preference for 
national uniformity over international uniformity would be expressed in 
terms of state rather than federal law, taking us back to a time—the 
1950s—when federalism objections prevented United States participation in 
the framing of the New York Convention on arbitration agreements and 
arbitral awards.71  My one source of solace is a Legal Adviser to the State 
 
69.  “’The Uniform Commercial Code is not uniform.’” Walsh v. Ford Motor Co., 807 F.2d 
1000, 1016 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (quoting J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 7 
(2d ed. 1980)). 
70.  See supra note 63. 
71.  See Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 
10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 494 U.N.T.S. 321; Pub. L. 91-368, § 1, 84 Stat. 692 (codified at 9 
U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (2000)). 
We maintained an isolationist position in the field of private international 
law long after we had abandoned the ostrich posture in the public law area. 
For example, as late as 1958 the United States delegation to the United Nations 
Conference on International Commercial Arbitration, because of the traditional  
concern regarding federal-state relations, was under instructions not to participate 
actively in formulating a convention for the recognition of foreign 
arbitral awards. After the conference adopted such a convention, 
the delegation recommended against our adherence thereto on the ground, 
among others, that the United States lacked a sufficient domestic legal basis 
for acceptance of an advanced international convention on the subject 
of arbitration. This always struck me as making us out even more backward 
than we were.  
Richard D. Kearney, The United States and International Cooperation to Unify Private Law, 5 
CORNELL INT’L L.J.1, 2 (1972). 
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Department who understands that compromise is a two-way street. More 
important, he understands that international lawmaking – even as to private 
international law — cannot simply be ceded to private interests.  Whatever 
the ultimate result for The Hague Choice of Court Convention, one can 
hope that the experience will cause the Department to reconsider its 
budgetary priorities, aware of the costs not just of excessive reliance on the 
private sector but of the normative cloak used to justify it.  
 
 
 
